Dorothy R Rey Appellant Ashford Cole First Respondent Albertina John Second Respondent [ECSC]

• Jurisdiction: St Vincent and the Grenadines
• Judge: Justice of Appeal,SATROHAN SINGH,ODEL ADAMS
• Judgment Date: 23 March 1999
• Judgment citation (vLex): [1999] ECSC J0323-1
• Court: Supreme Court (St Vincent and the Grenadines)
• Docket Number: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8 OF 1997
• Date: 23 March 1999

[1999] ECSC J0323-1

Before:

The Hon. Mr. Satrohan Singh Justice of Appeal

The Hon. Mr. Albert Redhead Justice of Appeal

The Hon. Mr. Odel Adams Justice of Appeal [Ag.]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8 OF 1997

Between:

Dorothy R. Rey

Appellant

and

Ashford Cole

First Respondent

and

Albertina John

Second Respondent

Appearances:

Mr. S. John for the Appellant

Mr. B. Commissiong for No.1 Respondent

Miss M. Commissiong with him

Mr. L. Lewis for Second Respondent

RULING

1 This is an application by motion on behalf of the first-named respondent for this court to revisit its judgment delivered on the 28 ^th July, 1998.

2 Learned Queen's Counsel, Mr. Commissiong submitted that this court has jurisdiction to do so under the inherent jurisdiction of the court or under the Slip Rule.

Page 9 of the judgment which reads in part as follows:

"It is declared that the first-named respondent is the fee simple owner of the land which he is in actual possession of, that is to say, the entire area of 25,594 square feet "less the small areas cultivated from time to time by the second-named respondent and the house spot occupied by the chattel house owned by the second-name respondent"

3 Learned senior counsel urged that the quoted words in the above paragraph should be deleted from the judgment because the court could not have meant by that judgment that second-named respondent should be granted that relief having regard to Mitchell J's Judgment which was varied by that paragraph. Mitchell J had ordered that $18,750.00 which was paid by the second-named respondent to the appellant towards the purchase and conveyance of the said lot of land on which her house stands be refunded to the second-named respondent.

4 Mr. Commissiong therefore argued that the court could not have meant to have made that declaration because by doing, the second-named respondent would have gained a double benefit in respect of the same lot of land. He argued that it is inequitable and unjust to the first-named respondent, Ashford Cole.

5 At first blush Mr. Commissiong's submission seemed very attractive and commended itself to this court as having jurisdiction to correct what was and seemed to be obvious injustice but on a careful analysis of the situation it would be revealed that when the appellant purported to sell and transfer the parcel of land to the second-named respondent for which she had no legal authority to do. When Mitchell J therefore...