Glennis Marlon Miils v Caribbean Resorts Ltd
| Jurisdiction | St Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Judge | ‘Henry, J.’ |
| Judgment Date | 19 September 2019 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2019] ECSC J0919-1 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Vincent) |
| Docket Number | SVGHCV2015/0099 |
| Date | 19 September 2019 |
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
SVGHCV2015/0099
and
Mrs. Zhinga Horne Edwards legal practitioner for the claimant
Mr. Stanley John Q.C. with him Ms. Keisal Peters of Elizabeth Law Chambers, legal practitioners for the defendants
Ms. Glennis Mills and Mr. Vidal Browne were married for several years. They jointly acquired a number of properties including one or more corporate entities. After their divorce in 2003 they were engaged in proceedings for division of their assets. Ms. Mills subsequently pursued a claim against Island Holdings Limited (IHL), Young Island Resorts Limited, St. Vincent Manufacturing Company Limited (SVGML) and Caribbean Resorts Limited (CRL) in relation to distribution of assets acquired jointly by the parties. Her husband Mr. Vidal Browne was involved as director of some of the companies. CRL is a company and carries on business under the name of Mariner's Hotel. Ms. Mills served as CRL's director up to January 10 th 2010 1.
In or about 2011, Ms. Mills, Mr. Browne, IHL, SVGML and CRL concluded a settlement agreement and a consent order regarding those associated proceedings 2. Mr. Browne represented IHL, SVGML and CRL as their director and signed in that capacity on their behalf in connection with the civil claim filed by Ms. Mills. He signed in his personal capacity in respect of the ancillary matrimonial proceedings. He is also the director of the French Verandah Inc. (‘TFVI’) which operates a restaurant business at Villa.
CRL and TFVI had been using lands at Villa (‘the disputed lands’) as a parking lot in connection with their respective businesses prior to the agreement. TFVI does so under licence and permission from CRL. The settlement agreement and consent order purported to obligate IHL to transfer the disputed lands to Ms. Mills. A transfer to this effect was subsequently executed and registered 3. CRL and TFVI continued to use the parking lot without paying rent to Ms. Mills although she requested rent. The land was previously registered to IHL.
On 15 th July 2015, Ms. Mills filed this claim against (‘TFVI’) and against CRL trading as MH 4. She seeks possession of the disputed lands which includes a knoll on which signage was erected by CRL; an injunction restraining CRL and TFVI from trespassing on the disputed land, mesne profits, interest and costs. They resisted the claim. They contended that they have acquired an interest in the subject land by adverse possession. They claimed a declaration that Ms. Mills is not entitled to possession of the disputed property; a declaration that they are entitled to possession of the disputed
The matter came on for trial on 6 th March 2018. The parties were directed to file submissions on the effect and import of the settlement agreement and the consent order on the proceedings in the present claim; whether and to what extent res judicata is applicable and if so, which parties are so bound; and whether enforcement proceedings under the CPR 2000 or a fresh claim would be the appropriate avenue for addressing matters arising from the referenced consent order or the settlement agreement. The parties submitted that res judicata and did not arise in respect of all of the issues. A decision on those issues was deferred for conclusion of the trial.
The case proceeded to trial on 12 th June 2018, the trial date having been vacated previously 5. It was adjourned for resumption of trial. Subsequent trial fixtures were vacated. The matter was then scheduled for resumption of trial on June 18 th 2019. On June 17 th 2019, CRL and TFVI 6 filed an application for leave to amend their defence. The proposed amendments seek to introduce an allegation issue estoppel and abuse of process allegations. The defendants contended that those are matters which should be ventilated in the interest of justice. Ms. Mills opposed the application. She argued among other things that it is a very late application which would substantially prejudice her. The application is dismissed for the reasons set out below.
The issue is whether leave should be granted to CRL and TFVI to amend their defence?
The trial of this case was postponed on several occasions. The initial trial dates were fixed for March 7 th and 9 th 2017 but were vacated. It was next set down for March 1 st 2018. No hearing took place on that date. On the next trial date, March 6 th 2018 the parties were invited to address the
When the trial commenced in June 2018 Ms. Mills led her evidence and closed her case on the same day. The defendants called their first witness Mr. Vidal Browne. The matter was adjourned during his cross-examination. The resumption of trial was scheduled for October 11, 2018 and then April 9 th 2019. Both dates were vacated due to short service of the notice of hearing. The trial was once again re-scheduled, this time to June 18 th 2019. Trial was again adjourned pending consideration of the present application.
It is useful to provide a brief chronology of the instant proceedings to date. By her claim, Ms. Mills alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of land at Villa comprising approximately 3 acres and registered by vesting deed number 2599 of 2011. She claimed that IHL had previously owned the land. She pleaded that part of it had been used by CRL and TFVI as a parking lot and part for placing their signage prior to the land being vested in her name in May 2011.
Ms. Mills alleged that the defendants have continued to use those portions of the land as a parking lot and for signage purposes since then. She alleged that she had no objections to such use provided that she received payment of rent in return. She claimed that the defendants have failed to honour her repeated written requests for rent by letters that she issued in 2012, 2013 and 2014. She pleaded that their continued use of the land created a tenancy at will which has been terminated by their failure to honour her requests and by her letter to that effect.
Ms. Mills alleged that the defendants have remained in occupation of the disputed land and have thereby become trespassers. By their Defence and Counterclaim 7 CRL and TFVI acknowledged that Ms. Mills is the paper title owner of the subject lands. They pleaded that they have occupied the disputed land since 2003. They acknowledged receipt of the letters sent to them by Ms. Mills seeking payment of rent. They denied that they are tenants at will; that any tenancy at will has been
terminated; that they have become trespassers; or that they have given no consideration for the use of the disputed land as allegedCRL and TFVI pleaded that they have occupied the disputed land for over 12 years and that the signage was located in that spot in excess of 20 years. They alleged that TFVI has occupied the parking area with CRL's permission. CRL claimed that it incurred significant cost in developing the parking area. The defendants denied that Ms. Mills or IHL were in possession of the disputed land at the time that they (CRL and TFVI) entered into possession. They pleaded that even if Ms. Mills or IHL was in possession at that time, her claim is barred pursuant to the provisions of the Limitation Act. They denied that Ms. Mills had suffered any loss or damage or is entitled to the relief claimed.
The defendants claimed that alternatively, Ms. Mills and/or IHL acquiesced in their acting to their detriment in expending considerable sums of money to improve the parking area in the belief that it would become part of the hotel premises. They pleaded that Ms. Mills is therefore estopped from denying that the parking lot or the knoll forms part of their property. In this regard, they claimed that Ms. Mills and Mr. Browne were both directors of CRL which was a subsidiary of IHL. CRL and TFVI pleaded that they were encountering difficulties due to lack of parking for their customers and therefore a small portion of IHL's land was used to build the parking area for their exclusive use. They claimed that the construction cost of $140,585.30 was paid by CRL. Ms. Mills did not admit that such difficulties were being encountered; that the construction was undertaken; and if so, at what cost.
CRL and TFVI alleged that in 2003, IHL arranged for a survey to be conducted to delineate and excise the parking area. They pleaded further that pursuant to the agreement in the 2010 proceedings, Ms. Mills resigned as a director of IHL and CRL in 2011 and received a lump sum payment from IHL which also vested its proprietary interests in the disputed land to Ms. Mills. CRL and TFVI claimed that they have continued to use and maintain the parking area and the display area on the knoll exclusively. They pleaded that it would be unjust and unconscionable for Ms. Mills to maintain a beneficial right of ownership to either the parking area or the knoll and thereby deny their proprietary rights to them.
Ms. Mills denied all claims to proprietary estoppel in respect of the parking area and knoll. She denied owning any share, right, title or interest in the parking lot when it was being developed by its then owner, IHL. She denied knowledge of IHL's or the defendants' business dealings at that time, including any expenditure allegedly incurred in developing the parking lot. She...
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