Jannette Mills Plaintiff v Glennis Marlon Mills Mauritz Patricia Mills Defendants [ECSC]
| Jurisdiction | St Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Judge | Mitchell, J |
| Judgment Date | 21 December 2000 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2000] ECSC J1221-2 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Vincent) |
| Docket Number | CIVIL SUIT NO. 129 OF 1999 |
| Date | 21 December 2000 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CIVIL SUIT NO. 129 OF 1999
This was an action for breach of trust brought by one sister against her other two sisters relating to the properties derived by them from their late father, George Volmar Mills (hereinafter "the deceased").
By an action commenced in this suit on 19 March 1999, the Plaintiff sought orders for: setting aside an Order of the Court made in suit No 270/1996; an account of monies received by the Defendants in the estate of the deceased; an injunction restraining them from further dealing with the assets of the deceased; an injunction restraining them from selling the Frenches property or any other property of the deceased; and an order that the sale of the Frenches and Villa properties be set aside. By a Statement of Claim filed on 11 August 1999 the Plaintiff claimed that the three parties are sisters of the whole blood; that theirfather died on 3 July 1977 having made his last Will and Testament dated 7 November 1995 whereby he had appointed Barclays Bank as his executor; that after his death Barclays Bank had renounced its right to probate; that on 18 October 1980 Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed had been granted to the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant; that at the time of his death the deceased had been the owner of properties at Prospect, Frenches and Villa; that he had devised those properties to his daughters for their lives and after their deaths to their heirs and assigns as trust property to be ultimately inherited by the children of the three sisters; that the deceased had intended that his grandchildren would be the ultimate beneficiaries of those three pieces of property; that the Defendants had made the First Application, a strange and unusual application, to the High Court in suit No 445/1989 which had never been brought to the attention of the Plaintiff and therefore that she was not bound by the Order made on 20 October 1989; that subsequently the Defendants had started the Second Application, a second strange and futile application, in High Court suit No 204/1996 for the sale of part of the Frenches property; that this application had been wholly unnecessary as both Defendants were tenants for life bound in law to preserve the property with a duty to rent it, maintain it, and preserve it, and to contact the Plaintiff if they intended to dispose of their life interest; that by a Third Application, which had been discontinued, they had asked the Court to permit them to sell the Frenches property and to divide the proceeds of sale among themselves; that by a Fourth Application in suit No 270/1996 brought by an originating summons under the Trustee Act, the two Defendants as life tenants had sought leave to sell the Prospect property and to divide the proceeds of sale between themselves as life tenants and among the beneficiaries in accordance with a valued appraisal; that the Plaintiff had never been made a party to those proceedings; that the Defendants had known that, like themselves, the Plaintiff had two children who were entitled to the remainder interests in the properties at Prospect, Frenches and Villa; that the said sale was not binding on the Plaintiff and was of no legal form or effect and ought to be set aside; that third parties who had purchased the said property had constructive notice of the terms of the Will; that the Defendants had never been appointed Trustees of the Will of the Testator; that the 1st Defendant had never been one of the Administraces of the Estate; that the 1st Defendant had wrongfully sold the remainder interest of the Prospect property without the knowledge and notification of the children of the Plaintiff or of the Plaintiff herself; that the Defendants had wrongfully sold the lands at Prospect and Villa and had dishonestly appropriated the proceeds of sale to themselves and had never properly accounted to the Plaintiff for such proceeds; that the Defendants had acted in breach of trust in that they had ignored the testator's will in relation to the Villa and Prospect properties, had wrongfully valued and sold them without consulting the Plaintiff or her children, and had wrongfully spent substantial parts of the proceeds of sale and had not properly accounted; that the Defendants by their reckless conduct and dishonesty intended to continue to sell property that ought not to be sold and to convert the proceeds of sale to their personal use; and the Plaintiff claimed, damages for breach of trust, an order setting aside the Order made in suit No 27/1996, an account, an injunction, an order that the sale of the Villa and Prospect properties be set aside, and such other relief as to the Court might seem just.
On 4 October 1999, the 1st Defendant filed her Defence, which was amended with leave on 25 April 2000. She claimed that by deed No 977 of 1977 the deceased had conveyed the Frenches property to the three sisters as tenants-in-common in equal shares; that by deed No 966 of 1977 he had conveyed the Villa property to the three sisters as tenants-in-common in equal shares; that the Order of the Court in suit No 445/1989 was a valid order merely declaratory of the interest of the Plaintiff, the Defendants, and their respective children under the Will; that the application in suit No 204/1996 relating to the sale of the "large" property at Frenches had been served on the Plaintiff and she had been fully aware of the application; that the Order in suit No 270/1996 was a valid order; that the Defendants as life tenants of the Prospect property were trustees of it and had properly sold the Prospect property pursuant to an Order of the Court of 6 July 1996; that the 1st Defendant had properly accounted to the Plaintiff with respectto the proceeds of sale and had apportioned the proceeds of sale pursuant to an actuarial report; that the Defendants had not wrongfully sold the Villa land, the 1st Defendant had merely transferred her interest to the 2nd Defendant by deed No 3397 of 1998; that the 1st Defendant had not acted recklessly or dishonestly in her dealings with the several properties that were the subject matter of this suit but, on the contrary, had consistently sought the sanction of the Court in her dealings with them.
By an Order of 22 September 2000, the 2nd Defendant served and filed her Defence late. Her Defence largely repeated the Defence of the 1st Defendant.
The Facts. The only witnesses before the court in this case were the three parties who gave their evidence and were cross-examined by the other two counsel at length. A number of exhibits were put in evidence. The facts as I find them are as follows: The deceased father of the three parties died on 3 July 1977 leaving him surviving his widow Nina and six children, the three parties to this suit and their three brothers. The widow died on 29 August 1979. At his death, the deceased had left a Will dated 7 November 1975 and drafted by a Mr Nanton, a solicitor now deceased. At the time of his death, the three daughters had been living in Canada. The Plaintiff had then been about 22 years old and a college student, and the 1st Defendant about 17 years old still in school, while the 2nd Defendant had been about 34 years old and working to support the three of them in Canada. The deceased had been the proprietor of St Vincent's main funeral home, a building contractor, auctioneer, and furniture maker. His entrepreneurism had permitted him to accumulate some wealth, which he had invested in properties in St Vincent. His son Cedric had gone into the funeral business in competition with him, and Cedric, together with his two brothers, had been cut out of the Will with token bequests. The deceased had originally appointed Barclays Bank to be the Executor and Trustee of his Will, but Barclays Bank had renounced after his death in 1977. A Grant of Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed had been made to two of his three daughters, the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, on 18 October 1980. There were three properties, among others mentioned in the Will, that were the cause of this family dispute. The first is known as the Frenches Land, the second the Villa Land, and the third the Prospect Land. Let us deal with them separately.
The Frenches Land. At the time of the deceased's death this property consisted of two separate parcels. They were dealt with in two separate devises in his Will of 7 November 1975. The first parcel, known to the parties as the "small" property he devised in clause 5 to his wife Nina for the term of her natural life and after her death to the 1st Defendant for her life, and after her death to the children of the three parties to this suit as tenants-in-common. The devise read as follows:
I give devise and bequeath my property situate at Frenches, Saint Vincent, which is bounded towards the North by lands of the heirs Arthur C Billinghurst towards the South by a Ravine towards the East by a Public Road and towards the West by others lands belonging to me and [sic] to my wife Nina Vermina for the term of her natural life and after her death to my daughter Glennis Marlon Mills for her life and thereafter to her heirs and those of her sisters as tenants-in-common.
This devise consisted of two consecutive life interests with the remainder to the "heirs" of the three parties in this case. The widow having died in 1979, the 1st Defendant was at the time of the trial the present life tenant of this "small" property at Frenches. Clause 5 was, as we shall see later, the subject of interpretation by the High Court in an earlier action, suit No 445/1989.
The second parcel of Frenches land is known to the parties as the "large" property. This the testator described in his Will as his dwelling-house and business place...
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