Metrocint General Insurance Company Ltd et Al v Mercedes Delplesche
Jurisdiction | St Vincent and the Grenadines |
Judge | Farara JA |
Judgment Date | 18 September 2023 |
Judgment citation (vLex) | [2023] ECSC J0918-2 |
Docket Number | SVGHCVAP2019/0019 |
Court | Court of Appeal (Saint Vincent) |
The Hon. Mde. Margaret Price-Findlay Justice of Appeal
The Hon. Mr. Trevor Ward Justice of Appeal
The Hon. Mr. Gerard St. C Farara Justice of Appeal [Ag.]
SVGHCVAP2019/0019
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Civil appeal — Motor vehicle accident — Judgment against insured for damages — Section 8 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (“the Act”) — Third Party statutory right to be indemnified by insurer for judgment debt — Appellate interference with case management decisions — Whether the learned master erred in striking out parts of the first appellant's defence — Statutory interpretation — Section 14(1)(h) of the Act — Whether the learned master erred in holding that section 14 of the Act invalidates the restrictions relied on by the insurer in the insurance policy — Whether the learned master applied too broad an interpretation to section 14(1)(h) of the Act — Whether the Act creates exceptions to third party statutory rights which the insurer can rely on to avoid liability to indemnify the second appellant under the Act
On 31 st July 2012 the respondent, Ms. Mercedes Delplesche obtained judgment in default of acknowledgement of service against the second appellant, Mr. Samuel De Roche in the sum of $23,815.00. The judgment originated from a claim by Ms. Delplesche that she was injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle owned and driven by the second appellant, Mr. De Roche. Ms. Delplesche asserted that Mr. De Roche had only paid a total of $3,600.00 towards the judgment debt and accordingly filed a claim in the court below against the insurer, Metrocint General Insurance Company Limited (“Metrocint”) pursuant to section 8 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (“the Act”).
In a judgment delivered on 19 th February 2019, the learned master referred to his powers under Rule 26.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2000 (“CPR”) to strike out parts of a statement of case if it disclosed no reasonable ground for bringing or defending the claim. After employing a broad interpretation of sections 8 and 14 of the Act, the learned master ordered, inter alia, that paragraph 5 of the amended defence filed on 19 th September 2018 be struck out as it did not disclose any reasonable ground for defending the claim. Paragraph 3 of the amended defence was also struck out for its failure to comply with Rule 10.5 of the CPR.
Dissatisfied with the decision, Metrocint appealed, seeking to have the learned master's orders set aside in their entirety. At the hearing, counsel for Metrocint abandoned grounds 3 and 4 of the appeal and proceeded with grounds 1 and 2, which can be condensed into a single issue, that is, whether the learned master wrongly interpreted section 14 of the Act and therefore erred in striking out parts of Metrocint's defence.
Held: dismissing the appeal, affirming the learned master's order and ordering costs of the appeal to the respondent, Ms. Delplesche to be paid by the first appellant, Metrocint, such costs to be assessed by a judge or master of the High Court if not agreed within 21 days, that:
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1. As the CPR expressly entrusts the High Court with the power and responsibility to actively manage its cases, great deference is paid to a judge's exercise of discretion in case management decisions. Accordingly, a litigant who challenges a case management decision or order must reach a very high threshold in order to justify an appellate court's interference with such a decision or order. The test for interfering with a judge's case management decision is not whether the Court of Appeal would have exercised its own discretion differently or made a different order. The Court must be satisfied that the decision exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible and may therefore be said to be clearly or blatantly wrong.
Multibank FX International Corporation v Von Der Heydt Invest S.A. BVIHCMAP2022/0061 (delivered 5th July 2023, unreported) followed.
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2. The modern approach to statutory interpretation is that the court seeks to give effect to the purpose of the legislation, which must be derived from its language and context. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose, so that controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which lead to its enactment. In light of what is now understood to be the modern approach, the Court does not accept the appellant's assertion that the literal rule should be the first resort in this case. Further, the ambiguity leading to the instant proceedings indicated the need to consider the section in its wider context. The purposive rule must therefore be applied, and the Act must be construed to suppress the mischief and achieve the objective of the legislature.
Gorbachev v Guriev [2023] KB 1 followed; Asiyah Grant v Javier Maduro BVIHCVAP2019/0001 (delivered 13th November 2019, unreported) followed.
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3. Applying this approach to the interpretation of section 14 of the Act, the Long Title of the Act (which states that the purpose of the Act is to ‘make special provisions for the protection of third parties against risks arising out of motor vehicle accidents, and related matters’) reveals that the rationale behind the Act is to govern the relationship between insurance companies, policyholders and third parties who may be affected by the insured's actions or negligence, to ensure that the interests of the third parties are protected. Section 14(1)(h) prevents the insurer from excluding liability in situations where the negligent driver was someone ‘named in the policy who may or may not drive a motor vehicle’. In this case, Mr. De Roche was the sole holder of, and person named in the policy, and therefore he is a person named in the policy who may drive the vehicle. Further, Metrocint's contention that he was not in compliance with the licensing laws means that he could also be categorised as a person named in the policy who may not drive the vehicle. The learned master was therefore correct to employ a broader interpretation of this section so as to give effect to the purpose of the section, which is to restrict or exclude certain provisions in the insurance policy to extend its cover to ensure greater protection of third party risks.
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4. Cases may arise where a holder of a driving licence for light motor vehicles is found to be driving a vehicle for which he has no licence. In each case, on evidence, a decision must be made as to whether the fact of the driver possessing a licence for one type of vehicle but found driving a vehicle of another type, was the main or contributory cause of the accident. If it is found that the accident was caused solely because of some unforeseen or intervening causes with no nexus with the driver not possessing the requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its liability under section 8 of the Act merely for a technical breach of conditions concerning the driving licence. In this case, Mr. De Roche was driving a vehicle that he owned and was insured by Metrocint, despite not having the requisite class of licence. Nonetheless, he was driving a regular vehicle, that just so happened to be a hired vehicle, and not any type of heavy-duty vehicle requiring special skill to drive. There is no evidence to suggest that the accident was brought about by his inability to properly drive the hired vehicle. Accordingly, the learned master did not err in striking out paragraph 5 of Metrocint's defence. The learned master considered all the relevant factors and actively managed the case to prevent the matter from proceeding to trial based on a defence which had no realistic prospect of success.
Ishwar Chandra and Others v The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others Appeal (Civil) 1213 of 2007 considered.
Ms. Tonya Da Silva for the First Appellant
No appearance for the Second Appellant
Mr. Cecil A. Blazer Williams for the Respondent
Farara JA [AG.]: This is an appeal brought by the first appellant against the judgment and orders of Moise M (“the learned master”) in which he struck out certain parts of the first appellant's defence in the court below, and in which he gave directions for the first appellant to amend the said defence to bring it into compliance with Rule 10.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (“CPR”). Leave was also granted to the respondent to file a reply to the amended defence and the matter was to be listed for further case management thereafter. The first appellant has sought to have the judgment set aside in its entirety and the relevant background is set out below.
On 31 st July 2012, Ms. Mercedes Delplesche (“Ms. Delplesche”) obtained judgment in default of acknowledgement of service against Mr. Samuel De Roche (“Mr. De Roche”) in the sum of $23,815.00. This judgment originated from a claim by Ms. Delplesche that she was injured in an accident involving motor vehicle number H6423 owned and driven by Mr. De Roche. She asserted that Mr. De Roche had only paid a total of $3,600.00 towards the judgment debt and she accordingly filed a claim in the court below against his insurer, Metrocint General Insurance Company Limited (“Metrocint”) pursuant to section 8 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act (“the Act”). 1
Metrocint then filed a defence, essentially asserting that it was not obligated to satisfy the judgment against Mr. De Roche. It claimed that at the time of the accident, Mr. De Roche did not possess the class of licence which would permit him to drive the insured vehicle, which was a hired vehicle. This,...
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