Patricia Anne Huggins v Lloyd Browne
| Jurisdiction | St Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Judge | ‘Henry, J.’ |
| Judgment Date | 21 March 2018 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2018] ECSC J0321-2 |
| Docket Number | SVGHCV2018/0001 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Vincent) |
| Date | 21 March 2018 |
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
SVGHCV2018/0001
Ms. Danielle France for the claimant/respondent.
Ms. Suenel Fraser of counsel for the applicant/defendant.
Ms. Patricia-Anne Huggins has accused Mr. Lloyd Browne of trespassing on her property at Golden Vale in the State of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (the subject property). She alleged that he did so in or around January 2014 and subsequently. She claimed that he has repeatedly dumped tree cuttings and other waste material on the subject land without her consent. Ms. Huggins filed a Fixed Date Claim Form (FDCF) in the High Court on 4 th January 2018 in which she seeks damages, an injunction and costs.
Mr. Browne filed a Defence 1 denying those allegations. He also filed a Notice of Application 1 for an order striking out Ms. Huggins' FDCF and statement of claim, on the ground that they disclose no cause of action, no reasonable ground for bringing a claim and no subject matter against which to found a claim or cause of action. He alleged further that Ms. Huggins' claim is misconceived and offends against rules 8.6(1)(a) and 26.3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2000.
Mr. Browne seeks damages for nuisance and trespass, costs, interest and a perpetual injunction to restrain Ms. Huggins from dumping refuse or anything on his property. At the first hearing of the FDCF, the parties were invited to make oral submissions on the application. They were also directed to file skeleton arguments and list of authorities. The application is dismissed for the reasons set out below.
The issues are:
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1. Whether Ms. Huggins' FDCF and statement of claim should be struck out as disclosing no reasonable ground for bringing a claim? and
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2. Whether Mr. Browne's application for damages, an injunction, costs and interest should be granted?
The Civil Procedure Rules 2000 (‘CPR’) empower the High Court to strike out a FDCF and statement of claim which disclose no reasonable ground for making such a claim. 2 However, such an order is seldom made as it is considered to be drastic and to be reserved for the most glaring
The court is required to conduct an assessment of the respective pleaded cases of each party and in doing so, it assumes that the allegations are factual. Even when a statement of case is weak, the court generally errs on the side of allowing the case to proceed to trial. In exercising its discretion, the court must ask itself whether justice can best be served by ordering ‘the claimant to supply further details or to serve an amended statement of claim.’ 4 It must also seek to give effect to the overriding objective to act justly.
Mr. Browne filed submissions in which he rehearsed several of those principles. Ms. Huggins argued that the instant case raises live issues which the court cannot determine at this time. She submitted that the court is to be guided by the legal principles which emerge from the judgment in Baldwin Spencer v Attorney General of Antigua 5.
Mr. Browne referred to the decisions in Michael Wilson et al v Temujin International Limited et al 6, Tawney Assets Limited v East Pine Management Limited 7, Attorney General of St. Lucia v Allen Chastenet et al 8, Didier et al v Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. 4, Norde v Mannix 9 and Real Time Systems v Renraw Ltd. 10 which rehearse the principles mentioned earlier. I will apply them to the facts of the case at bar.
Mr. Browne argued that Ms. Huggins' claim will fail as a matter of law and should be struck out as it is bad in law, has no real prospect of succeeding at a trial and should not be allowed to go past the initial stages. He contended that the statement of claim does not disclose any cause of action covered by Rule 8.1(5) of the CPR or at all.
He submitted that Rule 8.1(5) of the CPR makes it mandatory for fixed date claim forms to be used in specific types of proceedings, namely:
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1. claims arising out of hire purchase or credit sale agreements;
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2. proceedings for possession of land;
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3. whenever its use is required by a Rule or Practice Direction; and
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4. where by any enactment proceedings are required to be commenced by originating summons or motion.
Mr. Browne reasoned that based on the pleadings filed by Ms. Huggins, her claim is not an action for possession of land but rather an action which touches and concerns land. He submitted that therefore it should properly to be commenced by way of regular claim form. He acknowledged that notwithstanding this irregularity, the court is authorized by rule 26.9 of the CPR to ‘put matters right’, and to treat the action as it if were properly begun by claim form. He submitted that he recognized that the court may exercise its discretion in Ms. Huggins' favour and not strike out the claim this ground.
Ms. Huggins countered that she utilized the FDCF as her claim is for ‘proceedings for possession of land’ referenced in the rule. She submitted that the CPR does not define the term. She argued that Mr. Browne has disputed her legal title to the subject property and her entitlement to its possession. She contended that by refuting her claim, Mr. Browne has brought it into the category of claims for possession of lands.
She submitted that even if she is found to have used the incorrect form, this would not invalidate her claim or justify an order striking it out. She cited the case of Intrust Trustees (Nevis) Limited et al v Naomi Darren in which George-Creque JA refused to strike out a claim form and statement of claim and opined:
‘… to sacrifice substance by way of slavish adherence to form for the purpose of a genuine claim defeats the overriding objective of CPR rather than gives effect to it.’ 11
Ms. Huggins has correctly pointed out and Mr. Browne has accepted that the court will not lightly strike out a fixed date claim form or statement of case even if it was instituted by an incorrect originating process. His observation that Ms. Huggins' action is not for recovery of land or any of the claims contemplated by CPR 8.1(5) is accurate. It should therefore have been instituted by a regular claim form.
However, I am satisfied that such departure in the instant case does not warrant a step as drastic as striking out. An appropriate order would be one deeming the fixed date claim form to be a regular claim form or mandating the party to amend her pleadings accordingly.
Mr. Browne contended further that Ms. Huggins' claim discloses no subject matter against which to ground a claim and does not disclose any cause of action. Referring to paragraph 2 of the statement of claim he noted that Ms. Huggins alleged that she became the owner of a parcel of land situate in Golden Vale by Deed of Gift 1868 of 2014 from her my late hsband Mr. Arthur Hoskins Huggins.
He submitted that the schedule to the deed purports to describe the subject property allegedly conveyed to Ms. Huggins. He noted that it referred to property being ‘All the rest and residue …’. He argued further that this choice of words suggests that part of the property was already disposed of and the part being conveyed comprises only a portion of the lands. He submitted that in such a case the description must clearly and accurately describe the property being conveyed, by reference to the area or such other descriptive language.
Mr. Browne argued that in this regard the subject deed fell short, as a consequence of which the subject land is unidentified and unidentifiable from the instrument purporting to convey it.
He reasoned that the ‘deed’ is therefore an empty instrument incapable of conveying any property, has not conveyed any property and amounts to a sham or a farce. He contended that in the premises Ms. Huggins cannot definitively claim that he has trespassed on her property, since she has failed to establish her ownership to lot number 5 or any part of itHe submitted that the onus is on Ms. Huggins to properly establish a subject on which to found a claim and that she has failed to do so. He argued that as a result of this failure there is effectively no subject matter of the claim and it therefore has no real prospect of succeeding at a trial and should be struck out. He submitted that the court is not at liberty to correct such matters pursuant to CPR 26.9 because the issue is not merely procedural but rather substantive. Ms. Huggins rejoined that her statement of claim clearly identifies the disputed property as being land at Golden Vale.
CPR 8.7 imposes a duty on a claimant to set out all facts on which he or she will rely at the trial. The statement should be as short as practicable and should identify any documents which he or she considers to be necessary to the case. 12 Fulsome details may be provided subsequently in a witness statement or summary or affidavit as part of the evidence. 13
It is now well-established that a party will be permitted to particularize his or her case by providing evidence to substantiate his or her claims. In East Caribbean Flour Mills Ltd. v Ormiston K. Boyea, 14 the court explained that while pleadings circumscribe the broad issues and allegations which are particularized in witness statements or affidavit evidence. Accordingly, the court will not strike out a statement of case which outlines the broad factual and legal bases for a claim provided that it is one which is maintainable at law.
Under this ground, Mr. Browne has highlighted issues which are...
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