Princess Bibby v Anthony Constantine et Al

• Jurisdiction: St Vincent and the Grenadines
• Judge: Farara JA
• Judgment Date: 20 June 2025
• Judgment citation (vLex): [2025] ECSC J0620-2
• Year: 2025
• Court: Court of Appeal (Saint Vincent)
• Docket Number: SVGHCVAP2023/0006

Between:

Princess Bibby (Administratrix of the estate of Lloyd Bibby, deceased Pursuant to Order dated 21/11/13 in Claim No.260 of 2013)

Appellant

and

[1] Anthony Constantine

[2] Kelly-Ann Constantine

[3] Jimmy Constantine

[4] Melvina Constantine

Respondents

[2025] ECSC J0620-2

Before:

The Hon. Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis Justice of Appeal

The Hon. Mr. Trevor M. Ward Justice of Appeal

The Hon. Mr. Gerard St. C Farara Justice of Appeal [Ag.]

SVGHCVAP2023/0006

[Formerly SVGHCVAP2006/0023]

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

Civil Appeal — Allegations of fraud — Legal and beneficial owners of land — Deed of Gift — Appellate review of findings of fact of trial judge — Whether the trial judge misdirected herself in respect of the allegations of fraud — Whether the learned judge erred in principle in not allowing the allegation to be put to the 1 ^st respondent that he had instructed the legal practitioner to prepare the disputed deeds — Expert Evidence — Rules 32.2 and 32.4(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023 — Whether the learned judge erred in determining that the expert witness was not competent or qualified to make a diagnosis of the mental condition of the deceased — Whether the learned judge erred in principle in dismissing the medical evidence adduced by the expert — Whether the learned judge erred in principle by taking into account or giving too much weight to irrelevant considerations — Whether the learned judge erred in concluding that the claim was statute barred — Doctrine of proprietary estoppel

By order of the court dated 21 ^st November 2013, the appellant was appointed the administratrix of the estate of Lloyd Bibby, her late husband. On 7 ^th April 2014, the appellant as administratrix of the estate of Lloyd Bibby deceased, brought a claim in the High Court against the respondents (the defendants in the court below) seeking the following reliefs: (a) revocation of Deed of Gift dated 15 ^th June 1995 registered as No. 4051/1995 made between Lloyd Bibby as donor and his wife Princess Bibby (the appellant) as donee by which Lloyd Bibby conveyed 5,000 square feet of his land to this wife, the appellant; (b) a declaration that the 5,000 square feet of land contained in the schedule to Deed No. 4051/1995 belongs to Lloyd Bibby deceased; (c) cancellation of Deed of Gift dated 15 ^th June 1995 registered as No. 4052/1995 purportedly made from the appellant to the 1 ^st named respondent, Anthony Constantine, by which the appellant (in her personal capacity) conveyed the identical 5,000 square feet of land to the 1 ^st respondent (“the disputed land”). These two deeds (No. 4051/1995 and No. 4052/1995) were prepared by the same Attorney-at-law, Mr. Theodore Browne, and the execution of both deeds by the respective parties was witnessed by Ms. Marlene Edwards.

The appellant pleaded that she and the deceased did not know what they were signing, claiming that she was led to believe that the document constituted permission for the 1 ^st respondent to relocate abroad. The appellant's pleaded case was that the conveyance of the disputed land belonging to Lloyd Bibby by Deed No. 4051/1995 to the appellant, was procured by fraud and, accordingly, the appellant sought a declaration that the said Deed was void. The appellant also pleaded that her late husband had refused to give her son, the 1 ^st respondent, permission to build a house on part of his land. She further alleged that the 1 ^st respondent nevertheless proceeded to construct a wooden house on the disputed land, which he later converted to a wall house. It was also the appellant's pleaded case that the deceased was senile when he signed Deed No. 4051/1995, and thus the said deed was not his own act.

It was also pleaded by the appellant that the 1 ^st respondent subsequently disposed of the disputed land by Deed of Gift dated 24 ^th November 2010 registered as No. 3996/2010 to his two children, Kelly-Ann Constantine and Jimmy Constantine (the 2 ^nd and 3 ^rd respondents) and vesting in himself, and his wife (the 4 ^th named respondent) a life interest in the said disputed land. It was only after a dispute arose in 2005 (after the death of Lloyd Bibby) between the appellant's daughter and the 1 ^st respondent over the building of a second house on the disputed land, and the 1 ^st respondent informing her that he had a deed for the said land, that the appellant's daughter was prompted to conduct searches at the Registry in the capital Kingstown. It was then discovered that Deed of Gift No. 4051/1995 had been purportedly executed by Lloyd Bibby (deceased) conveying the said land to the appellant and Deed No. 4052/1995 executed by the appellant conveying the identical piece of land to the 1 ^st respondent.

In their defence and counterclaim, the respondents denied many of the factual allegations in the Statement of Claim. Specifically, the allegations and particulars of fraud were denied. In the defence, the respondents deny that Lloyd Bibby was ever senile. It was asserted that up to the time of his death he was still aware of his surroundings and maintained his mental faculties. It was pleaded that Deed of Gift No. 4051/1995 was not procured by fraud as alleged in the Statement of Claibut was executed as prescribed by the Laws of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It was asserted further that Lloyd Bibby had given instructions to his solicitor, Mr. Theodore Browne, for the preparation of the two Deeds of Gift (Nos. 4051/1995 and 4052/1995) in respect of the disputed land; and that Lloyd Bibby and the appellant were fully aware and had full knowledge and understanding of what he was signing. The respondents also pleaded and relied on the provisions of the Limitation Act asserting that the claim was statute barred it having not been filed within the stipulated 12 year period and cannot now be entertained by the court.

By way of the counterclaim, the respondents (as defendants) averred that since about the 1960's the 1 ^st respondent has been residing on a portion of the land described in the Deed No. 1433/1986 (referred to as “the family land”) along with his mother, the appellant, and his stepfather, Lloyd Bibby (deceased), and it is on the said land that he has continued to reside up to the date of the trial.

It was also pleaded in the counterclaim that by virtue of Deed of Gift No. 4052/1995, the 1 ^st respondent became vested in fee simple absolute of the said hereditaments therein which is in extent 5,000 square feet; which land he had later, by Deed of Gift No. 3996/2010, conveyed to his two children as beneficial owners, subject to the life interest of himself and his wife. Additionally, Ii was pleaded that it was always the intention of Lloyd Bibby (deceased) that the said disputed land be vested in the 1 ^st respondent and that the appellant is estopped or precluded from bringing the claim against the respondents.

Accordingly, the respondents counterclaimed for: (i) a declaration that the 2 ^nd and 3 ^rd respondents are the beneficial owners of the land described in Deed No. 3996/2010 subject to the life interest therein of the 1 ^st and 4 ^th respondents; (ii) an injunction restraining the appellant from trespassing or otherwise interfering with the respondents' possession of the said land; (iii) an order that any structure unlawfully erected on the said land be removed and/or destroyed at the expense of the appellant; and (iv) costs and further or other relief.

At the trial, the 1 ^st respondent argued that he had relied on the promise by the deceased that the land belonged to him and had acted to his detriment, accordingly, it would be unfair and unconscionable for the deceased's estate to seek to resile from his promise; and that the appellant was estopped from bringing the claim.

By judgment dated 6 ^th July 2016, the learned trial judge dismissed the appellant's claim in the court below with costs to the respondents. In the judgment, the learned judge identified the following issues asa arising for her consideration: (1) whether the respondents had secured the execution of Deed of Gift No. 4051/1995 from Lloyd Bibby through fraud and if so, to what remedy is the appellant entitled as administratrix of Lloyd Bibby's estate; (2) whether the appellant's claim as administratrix of Lloyd Bibby's estate is statute-barred; (3) whether the appellant as administratrix of Lloyd Bibby's estate is estopped from bringing the claim; (4) whether any or all of the respondents own an interest in the subject property; and (5) if so, whether the appellant as administratrix of the estate of the deceased has encroached on the property of the respondents.

The learned trial judge found that the respondents are the beneficial and legal owners of the disputed property conveyed to them by Deed of Gift No. 3996/2010. The learned trial judge made no order to setting aside the Deeds of Gift No. 4051 and No. 4052 of 1995, finding that the evidence of the expert witness, Dr. Miriam Francis-Sheridan, could not be relied upon in proving fraud on the part of the respondents on the basis that she lacked the requisite expertise to opine on the mental state of Lloyd Bibby when he executed Deed of Gift No. 4051/1995. The learned trial judge found that the evidence of the respondents' witness, Jimmy Constantine, with respect of the mental state of the deceased at the relevant time more credible, including that he had observed the deceased doing the ‘Monkey Dance’, and relied on this evidence in coming to her decision that Lloyd Bibby had the mental capacity to enter into Deed No. 4051/1995 and that he understood what he was doing in conveying the disputed land to his wife, the appellant, and by her onward to the 1 ^st respondent.

The learned trial judge also found that the appellant's claim in the court below was statute-barred under section 17 of the Limitation Act, having been filed outside of the 12-year limitation period...