Richardson v Richardson
| Jurisdiction | St Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Judge | Singh, J. |
| Judgment Date | 15 May 1987 |
| Neutral Citation | VC 1987 HC 8 |
| Docket Number | 204 of 1984 |
| Court | High Court (Saint Vincent) |
| Date | 15 May 1987 |
High Court
Singh, J.
204 of 1984
Mr. S.E. Commissiong for the applicant (husband)
Mr. O.R. Sylvester Q.C., Mr. Mark Williams with him for the respondent (wife).
Family law - Husband and wife — Maintenance — Married for sixteen years with no children — Determination of marriage assets — Applicant claiming that matrimonial home was solely his — Deed of conveyance in both parties name holding as tenants-in-common — Whether lump sum payment appropriate — Parties accustomed maintaining a high standard of living — Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, s. 25.
The applicant in this matter is the husband. On November 17 th, 1970, the applicant and the respondent both then 22 years old were married to each other. On September 23, 1985 the court granted a decree Nisi to the respondent on the ground that the applicant Duncan Richardson had behaved in such a way that the respondent could not have reasonably been expected to live with him and that the marriage was irretrievably broken down. This order was made on the answer and cross petition of the respondent, the applicant herein having been given leave at that hearing to discontinue his petition for divorce which was based on the same ground and an alternative ground of adultery by the respondent. This decree was made absolute on October 2, 1986. There were no children from this marriage and during the marriage the parties lived in Trinidad, St. Lucia and finally in St. Vincent and they last cohabited with each other on August 4 th 1983.
This is an application by the applicant Duncan Richardson for orders by way of ancillary relief:
- that the respondent make to the applicant such maintenance pending suit, and thereafter such periodical payments, secured provision and lump sum or sums of money as may seem just. 2. with regard to the settlement of the assets of the assets the marriage for his use and benefit. 3. that the respondent be ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to this suit.
The respondent Jankie Richardson whilst she has filed no notice of application for ancillary relief, in her cross petition prayed that she may be granted such financial provision orders and property adjustment orders for herself as may be just and that the applicant pay the costs of this suit.
Both parties filed affidavits in this matter and from these affidavits the assets of this marriage are stated as:
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(1) The matrimonial home at Rose Cottage St. Vincent “the matrimonial home”.
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(2) $237,000 TT representing the proceeds of sale of their former matrimonial home in Trinidad “the Trinidad Property”.
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(3) One Mitsubishi motor car
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(4) One Piper Cherokee 140 light aircraft
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(5) $20,000 U.S. abroad.
At the hearing both parties were cross-examined at length and having seen and heard both of them this court feels itself on safer ground if it accepts the evidence of the respondent in preference to that of the applicant wherever there is conflict not necessarily because the applicant may be lying but because the respondent seems more forthright and positive in her answers. The applicant's recollection of events are more hazy than that of the respondent and it appeared to me as if the respondent had more to do than the applicant with the day to day domestic affairs of the marriage whilst the applicant concentrated on his flying occupation. Another matter that struck me at this hearing was that whereas the respondent still seemed to possess some tender feeling for the applicant the latter appeared devoid of any such feelings and gives the impression from his demeanour his evidence that it would not faze him in any way if the court throws the respondent out in the street penniless.
With those initial observations I now proceed to deal with issues in this matter which are really what should happen to the matrimonial home, and, what financial relief if any should be given to the parties. And, my first task is to determine what are the net assets of this marriage. In this regard I find the Piper Cherokee Aircraft, the proceeds of the sale from Trinidad property, the matrimonial home in St. Vincent and a U.S. account with now some $11,000 to be the assets of the marriage. I do not find the Mitsubishi car of the respondent to be such an asset. I accept her evidence and as a fact that she acquired that car as gift from her brother in Trinidad. In this regard I accept as true her evidence as to the method adopted by herself, her brother and W.J. Abbott and Sons to get the car which method made her the owner of the car. There is no admissible factual or circumstantial evidence to the contrary and this court cannot indulge in speculations, also, I find it difficult to believe that this respondent can have such a devious mind as to be able to make up the details of this story. It has the ring of truth in it and I accept it.
With respect to the Piper Cherokee Aircraft and the Trinidad property I find as fact that they were bought solely with monies provided by the applicant and that the only contribution from the respondent in relation thereto would have been the day to day looking of the Trinidad home and her presence in Trinidad overseeing workmen when it was being repaired and extended.
As regards the “matrimonial home” there is in evidence the registered deed of conveyance for this property. This property was bought in 1980 for $151,000 and now has a value of some $257,000. It presently has a mortgage on it for a sum of $148,000 including interest. This registered deed places the legal title to this property in the joint names of the parties and declares their beneficial interests to be in equal shares, the exact words used are “tenants in common in equal shares”. In their evidence the applicant claims this property to be his solely and the respondent testifies that it is theirs jointly. The applicant wants it to the exclusion of the respondent and the respondent wants it subject to applicant's equal share in it. Evidence was led as to how this property was acquired. The question is can this court look at that evidence in order to get behind the clear unambiguous words of the deed to determine the share of each party in this property.
In Pettitt v. Pettitt [1969] 2 All E.R. 385 at p. 405 Lord Upjohn in the House of Lords had this to say when dealing with the property rights in that matter.
“… and the right of the parties must be judged on the general principles applicable in any court of law when considering questions of title to property, and though the parties are husband and wife these questions of title must be decided by the principles of law applicable to the settlement of claims between those not so related, while making full allowances in view of that relationship. In the first place the beneficial ownership of the property in question must depend on the agreement of the parties determined at the time of its acquisition. If the property in question is land there must be some lease or conveyance which shows how it was acquired. If the document declares not merely in whom the legal title is to vest but in whom the beneficial title is to vest that necessarily concludes the question of title as between the spouses for all time, and in the absence of fraud or mistake at the time of the transaction the parties cannot go behind it at anytime thereafter even on the death or the breakup of the marriage.”
The learned Lord Justice continued that if the document is silent as to the beneficial title and the property was conveyed in the name of one or the other or into the names of both spouses jointly then parol evidence would be admissible as to the beneficial ownership that was intended by them at the time of the acquisition. Stephenson LJ in Leake v. Bruizzi [1974] 2 All E.R. 1196 Peter Duckworth in his book Matrimonial Property and Finance 2 nd Ed. at p. 9 both endorse this proposition of law.
In my view the title deed in this matter having not only placed the legal title in the joint names of the parties as tenants in common also having declared their beneficial interests in equal shares, applying the principle of law above stated, I would have to hold a matter of law that that concludes the question and this court cannot now go behind those terms of the deed by looking at parole evidence in order to determine the intention of the parties at the me the property was acquired. There has been no allegation of fraud or mistake at the time of the acquisition.
In these circumstances I declare the beneficial interest of these parties to the “Matrimonial Property” to be in equal shares.
Mr. Commissiong in reply to this submission of Mr. Sylvester described Mr. Sylvester's opinion of the aforesaid law which opinion Mr. Sylvester supported with this authority of Leake v. Bruizzi (Supra) as “Judicial Nonsense” and then referred to the cases of Malayan Credit Ltd v. Jack Chia - MPH Ltd. PC 2 WLR 570, Griffiths v. Griffiths [1974] 1 WLR 1350 CAThames Guaranty Ltd v. Campbell [1984] 3 WLR 109 CA and Daubney v. Daubney [1976] 2 WLR 159 CA in support of his criticism of Mr. Sylvester's opinion. In my view these cases do not apply to the situation in the matter. In all of those cases the owners of the legal title to the properties are identified in the different deeds but in none of those cases are the beneficial interests declared in the deeds. So, whereas those cases represent the true legal position vis-à-vis the facts of those cases, they do not apply to the instant case which has the beneficial interest of the parties declared in no uncertain terms in the deed of conveyance.
Having determined the shares of each party in the “Matrimonial property” I now proceed to decide the financial provision aspect of this application and whilst both parties seem to be claiming financial relief from each other on paper, at the end of the day all the...
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