Webb and Webb v Eustace Auto Supplies Ltd and Quammie

• Jurisdiction: St Vincent and the Grenadines
• Judge: Henry, J.
• Judgment Date: 06 April 2017
• Neutral Citation: VC 2017 HC 35
• Date: 06 April 2017
• Court: High Court (Saint Vincent)
• Docket Number: SVGHCV 2013/006

High Court

Henry, J.

SVGHCV 2013/006

Webb and Webb

and

Eustace Auto Supplies Limited and Quammie

Appearances:

Mr. Julian Jack for the claimants.

Mr. Sten Sargeant for the defendant.

Negligence - Liability — Vicarious liability — Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher — Whether defendants vicariously liable/otherwise to claimants for damage to property by fire — Claims dismissed

BACKGROUND

Henry, J.

1 The claimants Malcolm and Vendetha Webb are brother and sister. They own a commercial property (‘the subject property’) on Middle Street, Kingstown from which Malcolm and his brother Michael Webb operate a retail business. The property shares a common boundary with commercial premises owned by Eustace Auto Supplies Limited, the first defendant (‘the company’). Mr. Eustace Quammie, the second defendant is one of its shareholders and directors.

2 Mr. and Ms. Webb alleged that while patch welding a metal container, the company's employee Monty Gill, negligently caused a fire that escaped and damaged their property. They contended that the company is vicariously responsible for Mr. Gill's actions. They seek compensation in the sum of $243,654.90 from the company and Mr. Eustace. The company and Mr. Eustace deny that Monty Gill was the company's employee or agent. They deny all liability. I have found that them not liable.

ISSUE

3 The issue is whether Eustace Auto Supplies Limited or Mr. Eustace Quammie is vicariously or otherwise liable to Malcolm Webb and Vendetha Webb for the damage to their property by fire?

PRELIMINARY NOTE

4 Ms. Webb did not attend the trial. She did not formally seek leave to be absent from the trial. However, her legal practitioner, Mr. Julian Jack represented to the court that she was unable to attend had given her consent to the matter proceeding in her absence and asked to be excused. The trial was conducted in her absence.

ANALYSIS

ISSUE — IS EUSTACE AUTO SUPPLIES LIMITED OR MR. EUSTACE QUAMMIE VICARIOUSLY OR OTHERWISE LIABLE TO MALCOLM WEBB AND VENDETHA WEBB FOR THE DAMAGE TO THEIR PROPERTY BY FIRE?

5 Mr. and Ms. Webb are the owners of the subject property registered by Deed No. 1837 of 2000. The adjoining property is registered by Deed No. 2669 of 1984 in the company's name. The company is registered under the Companies Act [Cap. 143 of the Revised Laws of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 2009.] as an automobile dealer and supplier of automotive parts including new and old tyres. On 21st April, 2012 Mr. Monty Gill was on the company's property patch welding a metal container that contained tyres. While he was doing so, the container caught fire which eventually escaped onto Mr. and Ms. Webb's property. It damaged their building.

6 Mr. Webb and his brother Michael testified that the subject property is used as a home for Michael and a place of business from which they manufacture and sell a non-alcoholic beverage and retail propane gas. Malcolm and Michael Webb recalled that on the fateful day, when they arrived at the site of the fire, it was already ablaze. The Fire Department was notified and the brothers took precautionary measures by placing fire extinguishers in close proximity to the fire. They managed to remove household items from the building which they secured away from the property. The fire raged uncontrollably and spread.

7 They observed that the fire had escaped from the container and onto a shed on the company's property and then onto their property, where it destroyed two bedrooms and caused extensive damage to the roof and certain sections of ground and first floors of their building. Michael Webb claimed to have lost all of his personal belongings. The Webbs averred that as a consequence of the fire, electricity supply to their property was interrupted for a period and Michael's personal life was affected for several days.

8 Sgt. Winston Maloney of the Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force was the officer in charge of the investigation. He was present when efforts were made by officers from the Fire Department and others to put out the fire. He confirmed that the Webb's property sustained significant damage.

9 Sgt. Maloney indicated that he interviewed Mr. Quammie and several other persons. He testified that Mr. Quammie informed him that he had employed Mr. Gill to do some welding work on the roof of the container but had left this detail out of his witness statement. He acknowledged that it is usual for a police officer to put into writing what someone tells him during an interview and admitted doing so when he interviewed Mr. Quammie. He did not produce his written record. For his part, Mr. Quammie indicated that Sgt. Maloney engaged him in casual conversation that day.

10 Mr. Quammie admitted that Mr. Gill was welding a door on the container, on the company's behalf when it caught fire. He acknowledged that he engaged Mr. Gill to do the repairs but denied that Mr. Gill was either his or the company's employee. He described Mr. Gill as an independent contractor who runs his own business from premises located at Randy's Supermarket. He stated that Mr. Gill usually brings his own tools when he is engaged by the company or him, to do welding work and that he did so on the day of the fire.

11 He testified that when the fire started he was in the store looking outside. He saw Mr. Gill running towards the water pipe in the yard. When he enquired of him what happened, Mr. Gill told him that smoke was coming from the container. According to him, no one opened the container.

12 The Webbs assert that either Mr. Quammie or the company is liable for the damage caused by the fire which arose from the welding. In this regard, they contend that Mr. Quammie or the company is vicariously liable as employer for Mr. Gill's conduct which resulted in the fire.

13 Mr. and Ms. Webb grounded their claim in the tort of negligence. They also introduced the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [ (1866) 1 Ex. 265; [1861-1873] All E.R. Rep. 1] in their pleadings, as a basis on which to seek relief. However, they made no submissions on that latter limb. The case of Rylands v. Fletcher enunciated the rule of law by which a cause of action is deemed to arise, against a person who (due to his failure to take necessary precautions) brings dangerous items onto his property, which escapes onto and causes damage on another property. Although Mr. and Ms. Webb did not actively pursue this aspect of their claim in their submissions, it will be addressed since it arises on the pleadings and was dealt with by the company and Mr. Quammie.

Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

14 At paragraph 5 of their statement of claim, Malcolm and Vendetha Webb pleaded:

‘5. At the said material time when the employee finished the patch welding the metal container caught fire. The employee opened the door of the said container NEGLIGENTLY CAUSINGTHE FIRE TO ESCAPE UNTO THE CLAIMANTS (SIC) PROPERTY, CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE THERETO.’ (underlining added)

Mr. Quammie and the company denied this allegation in their defence.

15 Malcolm Webb, his brother Michael and Sgt. Maloney provided vivid testimony that the fire started on the company's property and spread to the Webb's neighbouring property. This was not denied by Mr. Quammie or the company.

16 Mr. and Ms. Webb submitted that the company and Mr. Quammie did not appear to have taken any reasonable precautions to prevent the fire from extending to the Webbs' property and therefore failed in their duty to them.

17 Mr. Quammie and the company countered that at common law, there is no strict liability for dangerous activities. They cited the case of Read v. J Lyons & Co [[1946] 2 All ER 471] and quoted Lord MacMillan as authority for that proposition, where he opined:

in the modern law of tort … liability exists only for consequences which a reasonable man would have foreseen. One who engages in obviously dangerous operations must be taken to know that if he does not take special precautions injury to others may very well result. In my opinion it will be impractical to frame a legal classification of things as things dangerous and things not dangerous, attaching absolute liability in the case of the former but not in the case of the latter. In a progressive world things which at one time were reckoned highly dangerous come to be regarded as reasonably safe. … Accordingly I am unable to accept the proposition that in law the manufacturer of high explosive shells is a dangerous operation which imposes on the manufacturer an absolute liability for any personal injuries which may be sustained in consequence of his operations. Strict liability, if you will, is imposed upon him in the sense that he must exercise a high degree of care, but that is all. … in my opinion, … the law in all cases exacts a degree of care commensurate with the risk created. It was suggested that some operations are so intrinsically dangerous that no degree of care however scrupulous can prevent occurrence of accidents and that those who choose for their own ends to carry on such operations ought to be held to do so at their peril. … In my opinion it is not the present law of England. [Ibid. at page 477 A-D]

18 Mr. Quammie and the company argued that neither the pleadings nor the evidence alleged that patch welding was a non-natural use of the company's premises, and further, that fire cannot be said to be a ‘brought and kept in’ or on the company's premises and be allowed to escape. They contended further that liability could not even be imposed as a matter of public policy. They concluded that no strict liability can attach to the company in the circumstances of the case at bar.

19 Quoting Lord Goff, in a decision of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties [1994] 2 AC 264 they submitted that the types of activities which could potentially attract strict liability considerations and appropriate...